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Recent
Activities
Tapes and Transcripts in Federal
Court
By Robert S. Bennett
Recent decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit have provided the trial attorney with the
proper procedures for presenting tape recordings and
transcripts In Federal court. By following these decisions,
the trial attorney can expedite a trial and help eliminate
any problems, which would cause the case to be retried.
Although the use of tape recordings is more prevalent in
criminal cases, the procedures to be discussed also have
application in civil cases.
Under normal circumstances, recordings are produced in three
ways: (1) court authorized wiretaps of telephone
conversations; (2) consensual telephone conversations: and
(3) body recorders. Within the last two years In San
Antonio, Texas, the Federal government. In three separate
Investigations has indicted 22 Individuals by the use of
court-authorized wiretaps of telephone conversations. These
telephone conversations were recorded, and transcripts were
prepared from the recordings. Numerous other cases were
investigated by the use of body mikes and consensual
telephone Nations.
A consensual telephone conversation occurs when two
Individuals talk on a telephone and one party records or
gives his permission to record the conversation: the
resulting tape can be Introduced Into evidence. This is
probably the most common method of producing tape
recordings.
Finally, a person can be equipped with a tape recorder or a
body mike either to record a conversation or to transmit the
conversation to a receiver for recording.
There has been one recent Fifth Circuit opinion which
directly held that the Jury would be allowed to replay a
tape which was in evidence in the jury room. The one problem
with the decision is that there is no indication whether or
not a stipulation of admissibility was agreed upon. The
Court did say, however, that it was “within the trial
court's discretion to decide whether secondary exhibits
should accompany the jury into the jury room.” 33
If the parties cannot agree to the identification of the
voices on the recording by means of a stipulation, there are
other means to establish the identity of the participants
Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b) states.
(5) Voice Identification. Identification of a voice, whether
heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic
transmission or recording, by opinion based upon hearing the
voice at any time under circumstances connecting it with the
alleged speaker.
The identification of the participants' voices may be
predicated upon face-to-face conversations and also
circumstantial evidence alone. Under the general rule,
testimony by a witness that he recognized the accused by his
voice is admissible in evidence provided only that the
witness has some basis for comparison of the accused voice
with the voice which identifies as the accused 14 The courts
have consistently upheld face-to-face conversations as
sufficient basis for voice identification. 15
In all cases the degree of familiarity with the defendant’s
voice has varied. It does not seem to matter when the
witness became familiar with the voice in question. In the
Ramos case, supra, Judge Rayfiel deemed sufficient a
one-hour conversation by the agent with the defendant prior
to the monitored conversation in question. In the Mora case,
supra, the personal confrontation between agent and accused
took place after the overheard conversations. Similarly. In
the McCartney case, supra, the agent's personal conversation
with the defendant took place after the overheard
conversations.
The Easterday case, supra, is significant because there the
witness testified only that he thought the voice on the
phone was that of the defendant, although he testified that
he had heard the defendant speak on several occasions.
Furthermore, circumstantial evidence alone may establish the
identity of a defendant’s voice sufficient to enable a jury
to consider It. 16
United States v. Carba.17 an appeal from the Hobbs Act
conviction, the decision of the trial court to allow into
evidence testimony concerning a telephone conversation with
someone not identified by the witness as the defendant was
upheld.
The fact that Chagin could not identify the speaker does not
necessarily render this testimony inadmissible identity
could be found by the jury from other circumstances,
admission of the testimony was proper. 18 Id, at 743.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed a narcotics conviction In which
circumstantial evidence was introduced in Palos v. United
States. 19the court stated:
The second alleged error is that testimony relating to the
monitored telephone call was improperly admitted because the
government agent who testified could not identify the voice
of the person called as that of Palos. Circumstantial
evidence however can be used to establish the identity of
the person called [citing Carbo, supra. and Morton v. United
States, 60 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1932)). Here, Villar dialed a
number registered to the appellant. When the phone was
answered. Villar asked "Palitos?" (a name under which
appellant was known) and received a response 'Yes. this is
he". We think this evidence was sufficient to make out a
prime facie case from which the jury could have concluded
that the appellant was a party to the conversation.
In United States v. Ramsey. 20, in which a conviction for
violations of the narcotics laws was affirmed, the court
took into consideration both direct and circumstantial
evidence of voice Identification. In that case an agent
testified that the voice he overheard on the telephone was
that of the defendant. In affirming conviction the court
noted that "there was ample evidence to support Its (agent's
testimony) reliability.
It is vital to properly establish the identity of speakers.
This part of the authenticating process with the previously
discussed steps) can best handled by stipulation or at the
pretrial hearing.
1. United States v. Mendoza. 574 F.2d 1373. (5th Cir. 1978)
2. Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
3. United States V. Santillo. 507 F.2d . 629 (5th Cir.)
cert. denied sub nom. United States v.< Buche 421 US. 968
(1975).
4. United States v. McMillan, 508 >F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1974).
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 916 (1975).Unites States v.-Biggins,
551.F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1977).
5. United States v. Rochan. 563 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1977).
6. United States v. Juarez, 573 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1978).>
United States V. Avile, 443 F-2d 792 (5th Cir, 1971).
7. Biggins. supra.
8. United States v. Greenfield. 574 F.2d 305 (5th Cir.
1978).
9. United States v. Onorl. 535 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1976).
10. Onorl, supra, 535 F-2d at 949.
11. United States v. McMillan, supra.
12. United States v. Carson. 464 F.2d 424 (2nd Cir.) cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 949 (1972).
13. United States V. Zepedo-Santa. 569 F.2d 1386 (5th Cir.
1978). Sea also United States v. Stone. 472 F-2d 909, 914
(5th Cir. 1974).
14. United States v. Ladd. 527 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1976)./p>
15. United States v. Esterday. 57 F.2d 165, 167 (2nd Cir.)
cert. denied 286 U.S. 564 (1932).United States v. Mola. 251
F.2d 255, 257 (2ndnbsp; Cir. 1938): United Slates v.
McCartney. 264 F.2d 628 (7th Cir.1959): United States v.
Ramos, 158 F. Supp. 825 (D. N.Y. 1958).
16. Grogan V. United States. 394 F2d 287, 291 (5th Cir.
1967).
17. United States v, Carbo, 314 F.2d 718 lath Cir. 19611.
18. Carbo. supra. 314 F.2d at 743.
19. Palos v. United States. 416 F.2d 438. 440 (5th Cir.
1969) cert. denied. 397 US. 980 (1970)
20. United States v. Ramsey, 374 F2d 192 (2nd Cir. 1967)
21. Ramsey, supra. 374 F2d at 195.
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